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Foreword 
The present report aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the pandemic situation of COVID-19 in the 
EU countries, and to be able to foresee the situation in the next coming days. We provide some figures and 
tables with several indexes and indicators as well as an Analysis section that discusses a specific topic related 
with the pandemic. 
As for the predictions, we employ an empirical model, verified with the evolution of the number of confirmed 
cases in previous countries where the epidemic is close to conclude, including all provinces of China. The 
model does not pretend to interpret the causes of the evolution of the cases but to permit the evaluation of 
the quality of control measures made in each state and a short-term prediction of trends. Note, however, 
that the effects of the measures’ control that start on a given day are not observed until approximately 7-14 
days later. 
We show an individual report with 8 graphs and a summary table with the main indicators for different 
countries and regions. We are adjusting the model to countries and regions with at least 4 days with more 
than 100 confirmed cases and a current load over 200 cases. 
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Situation and highlights 
Global situation 
The set of three figures shows the evolution 
of 14-day cumulative incidence (A14) of the 
three European countries that currently 
report the highest number of cases per 
week. From a graphical point of view, we can 
speak about a second wave, although 
current epidemiological situation is very 
different from that of March and April, since 
the diagnosis covers a much higher 
percentage of cases. The second figure is an 
enlargement of the second wave, starting at 
the Spanish second wave’s onset. In this 
figure we observe that the growths in France 
and UK started later. In the third figure we 
have shifted the curves so that their onsets 
are overlapped. Then, we observe that 
France and Spain are really following a very 
similar evolution and that UK is also starting 
the same way. 
The three countries have some 
characteristics in common like a large 
population or highly densed metropolitan 
areas. Nevertheless, no country can relax 
surveillance, since the second waves can 
affect anyone. Epidemiological surveillance 
must be increased as much as possible. 
Growth in France (13/7/2020) started about 
23 days after Spain (19/6/2020), and growth 
in the UK (6/8/2020) started about 24 days 
after France. These days correspond to day 
0 of the third graph. 
Highlights 
• Spain, France, Czech Republic and 
Malta are above the 100 cases per 
100,000 inh. last 14 days.  
• All the countries but Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Iceland have an empiric 
reproduction number equal to or 
higher than 1. 
• Six countries show an EPG>100 
(Spain 358, Czech Republic 228, 
France 193, Austria 141, Hungary 
120, Netherlands).  
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Situation and trends per country 
Maps of current situation in EU countries. Colour scale is indicated in each legend. 
• Cumulative incidence: total number of reported cases per 100,000 inhabitants 
• A14: Cumulative incidence last 14 days per 100,000 inhabitants (active cases) 
• ρ7: Empiric reproduction number  
• EPG: Effective Potential Growth (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝐴𝐴14 · 𝜌𝜌7) 
 







Table of current situation in EU countries. Colour scale is indicated in each legend. 
 
(1) ρ7 is the average of 7 consecutive ρ, but can still fluctuate. (2) EPG stands for Effective Growth Potential, which is the 
product of reported cumulative incidence of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants by ρ7 (empiric reproduction number). 







Situation and trends in some European regions1 
Table of current situation in Spain regions. Colour scale is indicated in each legend. 
 
 






Table of current situation in United Kingdom regions. Colour scale is indicated in each legend. 
























(1) ρ7 is the average of 7 consecutive ρ, but can still fluctuate. (2) EPG stands for Effective Growth Potential, which is the 
product of reported cumulative incidence of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants by ρ7 (empiric reproduction number). 








(1) ρ7 is the average of 7 consecutive ρ, but can still fluctuate. (2) EPG stands for Effective Growth Potential, which is the 
product of reported cumulative incidence of last 14 days per 105 inhabitants by ρ7 (empiric reproduction number). 







Analysis: Spanish second wave (III). Personal responsibility measure comparisons. 
A policy proposal to advance research. 
In the assessment of last week dealing with the analysis of the second wave of Covid-19 infection in Spain2 
we asked ourselves about the different hypotheses that can explain why Spain is the leading country in new 
infections. We showed that Spain opened earlier than most countries in terms of active cases and that the 
evolution has been worse. However, there have been some key countries (France, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Romania as key examples) that opened roughly at the same time in epidemiological terms and have had a 
better evolution in the sense that the number of cases started to raise later. As we are arguing, the 
explanation for Spain leading the second wave is multifactorial. In last report we started another factor or 
hypothesis, which states that Spanish population has followed a pattern of interactions and behavior who 
has facilitated transmission compared with the pattern of other countries. First, we discussed the use of 
masks in Barcelona3, and we will continue the discussion in this report. Next week we will explore the third 
hypothesis, which points to low-prepared control strategies like test and trace.  
We must recall that the relevance of risky behavior in Covid-19 has been stablished by the apparent low 
dispersion of this disease, namely, low number of people carry out the majority of infections. Second, the 
risky behavior is associated to two factors, one related with default-patterns of behavior and other with 
active individual prevention measures: 
• Default patterns of behavior refer to the properties and structure of the interaction between 
people infected. This refers to how often, given a cultural and sociological setting, a given population 
has an interaction on average that it is highly risky. The most classical example is the distance 
between family and friends in a meeting, or the number of drops and aerosol expels depending on 
the voice level. It is a fact that keeping distances prevent infections and strong indications than high 
voice/singing or low ventilation increase risk4. All other things equal, a country with more karaokes 
is riskier that one without. All other things equal, a country where the typical distance in a family 
meal is 30-50 cm is more dangerous than one where the average is 70-100 cm. 
• Active individual prevention measures. Health authorities have insisted in Spain and other countries 
that mask, distance and hand-washing are key features that can prevent infections. Good ventilation 
and the avoidance of party-like gatherings have also been indicated as things to avoid. A country 
where its population follows this instruction more widely is going to have less propagation than one 
where its citizen follow the guidelines less broadly. The messages often mix the idea that you protect 
the other with messages that you can protect yourself. The general idea of the message is that using 
these measures you mainly protect others but also a bit yourself. 
We showed that mask wearing in the streets and supermarkets during daytime hours was pretty high but 
dropped to almost non-existent in bar terraces of Barcelona3. We also showed that mask wearing in 
Barcelona was rather low in the groups’ gatherings of the main large parks with one important caveat. Elder 
population was very absent in those settings. We do not have the resources to check where the elder 
population meets (banks in the street, small squares, small parks?) and at what ratios they do wear mask. 
We also do not have the resources to check how the picture changes in squares and small parks. This would 
be very important from now on, especially for those near schools where parents and kids gather at very 
particular hours.  
                                                          
2 https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/328331  
3 https://upcommons.upc.edu/handle/2117/328775  




We point out that the latest COSMO-STUDIO by Instituto de Salud Carlos III in Spain5 points in exactly the 
same direction. Spaniards perceive more risk in agglomerations outside home, especially in public transport, 
but they consider family gatherings at home one of the lower risk activities.  
Combined, the picture that emerges is clear. There is important data pointing to relaxation when Spaniards 
meet together outside in terraces and that could reflect what is happening in family/friendly meetings in 
personal houses, where risk is considered one of the lower risk activities  
It is precisely in those close settings where the probabilities of getting infected increase dramatically. This is 
not different in Spain. While Spain does not provide anonymized information of the tracing work which could 
give detailed crosstabs of where and when people get infected (or at least those detected), health officials 
did report the following information6: 
• 32 % of cases (33 % of clusters) come from social meetings with friends or family who are not the 
close family unit and leisure activities. 
• 37 % of cases (31 % of clusters) come from interactions with people at work or in the link between 
family and work. For this particular setting we do not have information of how many where 
associated with close contact with different people at work/lunch and subsequent contagion in the 
family and how many due to friendly gatherings of works colleagues and respective families. 
In any case, around 30% of clusters are associated uniquely with close distance between sporadic or unknown 
contacts.  
Furthermore, epidemiologists and health official teams search patterns of high risk in selecting those close 
contacts of PCR positives that must follow quarantine. Presently, quarantines are imposed to 4 people per 
positive case on average in Spain/Catalunya, indicating that only very close contacts are selected. Public 
health protocols define as close contacts those that have spent more than 15 minutes at less than 1.5-2 
meters from the positive case, usually without wearing mask7, since 48 hours before the symptoms’ onset. 
This means that, with very low exceptions, people not in close contacts are not selected. And yet, our 
estimation of how many people are detected from the total in Catalonia for example (the case we know 
better) clearly indicated a diagnosis rate larger than 70 %, maybe even closer to 80 %. 
There is strong evidence then that the great majority of cases are related with infection produced at short 
distance. We have looked for corroboration in the literature. Indeed, we have not found, so far, any case 
where it has been clearly demonstrated that infections happened at more than 5 meters. However, there are 
examples of infections in the 2m-5m range in settings with high voice/singing and low ventilation8. Given the 
difficulty in finding situations where people stood always more than 2 meters apart, the fact that they are 
probably a minority does not mean that they are negligible. 
We can conclude that wearing mask in public in indoor settings like shops, supermarkets or even at work at 
higher rates probably confers an advantage to Spaniards in preventing 2-5m infections and reduces the risk 
of infection in case there are agglomerations. Unfortunately, this comparative advantage can be erased if the 
behavior at close contact with family, friends and co-workers, where most infections occur, carries more risk 
in a standard dinner or meeting in Spain than in other countries. 
A clear question then arises. Are the gatherings with friends and co-workers without mask much more risky 
in Spain than in other countries in the different settings where they happen? The reason for the question 
                                                          
5 https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/serviciosdeprensa/notasprensa/sanidad14/Paginas/2020/250820-estudio.aspx  
6 https://www.mscbs.gob.es/profesionales/saludPublica/ccayes/alertasActual/nCov/documentos/Actualizacion_199_COVID-19.pdf  
7 https://www.mscbs.gob.es/profesionales/saludPublica/ccayes/alertasActual/nCov/documentos/COVID19_Estrategia_vigilancia_ 
y_control_e_indicadores.pdf  




is clear. Most countries report not using masks. Spain is thus clearly not having riskier behavior in this sense. 
Spaniards can have riskier behavior that its European counterparts only if: 
• They remain at close distance much more often without keeping the recommended distance. 
• They talk loudly or shout or scream more often in those settings. 
Let us advance here the conclusions. There is indirect evidence that points to riskier behavior at close 
contact in Spain, but there is no way to provide a fully quantitative answer to this question. Without the 
details of tracing studies and contacts from European health authorities and uniform self-reporting 
behavioral studies is not possible to assess whether in Spain there has been riskier behavior on average 
than other European countries like France or Netherlands. The evidence pointing in the direction of riskier 
behavior is not presently quantifiable and cannot be compared with the benefits of general mask wearing in 
street/supermarkets/shops. In this scenario, the relaxation of masks wearing has allowed the possibility of 
having a second wave and, in this sense, it has been an important factor. We must insist on this point, the 
relaxation of mask wearing or not keeping personal distance is a necessary condition for a second wave since 
without it there is no possibility of it. Nevertheless, other factors must be analyzed as well: socio-economic 
factors and the readiness of the tracing and quarantine process must be assessed in future reports. 
Let us provide the two pieces of evidence that indicate that Spaniards might have riskier behavior in relation 
with distance and voice levels and how this data is difficult to quantify and compare with the advantage of 
wearing masks in supermarkets/street/… The best data available is a direct comparison with the Netherlands. 
1) In Spain, family meetings are considered low risk by citizens, as indicated. This suggest that 1.5 
meters distance rules are not followed generally. On the other hand, in the Netherlands, the self-
evaluation of keeping 1.5 meters distance apart in gatherings has been high and slowly decreasing 
over time according to self-reported information. In the first round of the Research behavioral rules 
and well-being9 a full 2/3 reported taking 1.5 m distance when receiving visitor at home. This ratio 
has fallen in the subsequent months (lower 12% in the second round). The key paragraph of the last 
survey regarding this issue is the following10 : 
The number of people who find it easy or very easy to stay 1.5 meters apart decreased between April 
and June (from 63% to 45%). However, there has been no significant reduction since the previous 
survey (3 weeks earlier), despite the decision to ease the government measures. Participants indicated 
that they more often manage to keep their distance in the cinema or theatre (74%) and in cafés and 
restaurants (55%) than in the supermarket (13%) or at work (24%) 
This points to a highly self-reported compliance in family meetings and in bar terraces. However, they 
are not directly comparable with Spanish surveys, making it impossible to put a close number. In this 
line of uncertainty, inter-personal distance at which Spain feel at easy is one of the shortest in the 
world for strangers but not necessarily so, compared with Germany for example, when Spaniards 
consider someone a close person. Unfortunately, in the seminal paper in 2017 dealing with these 
issues Preferred Interpersonal Distances: A Global Comparison11 there is no direct comparison 
between Spain and France nor Netherlands. 
2) Spain is the country with the highest level of noise pollution. Its main cities always rank first in the 
international ranking which measure dB levels. Loud conversation in the streets are either the cause 
or the consequence (or both) of noise pollution.  Spaniards speaking loudly is, at the bare minimum, 
a well-known stereotype well rooted in this fact of Spanish outdoor life. However, despite the 
                                                          
9 https://www.rivm.nl/en/novel-coronavirus-covid-19/research/behaviour/behavioural-measures-and-well-being/round-1 





relevance of the question, we have not found any quantitative study that show how louder Spanish 
speak in family meetings and gatherings with friends indoors compared with other countries. This is 
especially important given that Spaniards do speak faster12 which could lead to different perceptions. 
We should notice, however, that even if we could have data about dB levels in indoor meetings in 
Spain, as we have for outdoors, and compare it with France or Netherlands, the lack of data from the 
analysis of contacts and infection location would not allow us to check if both pieces of evidence 
point, at least, in the same direction. More importantly, we would not have comparable survey 
results of how often they did have a family meeting that can be used as the reference point. 
Taking into account all this, the final conclusion of this assessment is to provide one recommendation: 
It is well known the importance in making public and available the data on contact tracing to know where 
the detection infections are happening in order to explain better how and when infection happen and how 
to prevent it, both using public health measures and messages which try to change personal behavior. We 
must include the recommendation that self-reported surveys of behaviors are also key and they should be 
as uniform as possible in order to allow for comparison. We think that this would help to advance the 







                                                          




Legend: Countries’ reports details 
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(2) Analysis and prediction of COVID-19 
































































(1) Data source 
Data are daily obtained from European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)13 and country 
official sources (when indicated). Daily data comprise, among others: total confirmed cases, total confirmed 
new cases, total deaths, total new deaths. It must be considered that the report is always providing data from 
previous day. In the document we use the date at which the datapoint is assumed to belong, i.e., report from 
15/03/2020 is giving data from 14/03/2020, the latter being used in the subsequent analysis.  
(2) Data processing and plotting 
Data are initially processed with Matlab in order to update timeseries, i.e., last datapoints are added to 
historical sequences. These timeseries are plotted for individual countries and for the UE+EFTA+UK as a 
whole: 
 Number of cumulative confirmed cases 
 Number of reported new cases 
 Number of cumulative deaths  
Then, two indicators are calculated and plotted, too: 
 Case fatality rate: number of cumulative deaths divided by the number of cumulative confirmed 
cases, and reported as a percentage; it is an indirect indicator of the diagnostic level. 
 ρ: this variable is related with the reproduction number, i.e., with the number of new infections 
caused by a single case. It is evaluated as follows for the day before last report (t-1): 
𝜌𝜌(𝑡𝑡 − 1) =
𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 1) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 2)
𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 5) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 6) + 𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑡𝑡 − 7)
 
where Nnew(t) is the number of new confirmed cases at day t. Then, we calculate a 7-day moving 
average (ρ7) so that noise is reduced and trends become clearer.  
(3) Classification of countries according to their epidemic level: the scale Biocom-Cov 
Countries are assigned a degree in the discrete Biocom-Cov scale, which aims to facilitate a simple way of 
assessing the situation of the country. It is based on the level of daily new cases per 100,000 inhabitants as 
follows: 
Pandemic degree Daily new incident 

















(4) Fitting a mathematical model to data 
Previous studies have shown that Gompertz model14 correctly describes the Covid-19 epidemic in all analysed 
countries. It is an empirical model that starts with an exponential growth but that gradually decreases its 
specific growth rate. Therefore, it is adequate for describing an epidemic wave that is characterized by an 
initial exponential growth but a progressive decrease in spreading velocity provided that appropriate control 
measures are applied. Once in the tail, predictions work but the meaning of parameters is lost. 
Gompertz model is described by the equation:  





where N(t) is the cumulated number of confirmed cases at t (in days), and N0 is the number of cumulated 
cases the day at day t0. The model has two parameters: 
 a is the velocity at which specific spreading rate is slowing down; 
 K is the expected final number of cumulated cases at the end of the epidemic. 
This model is fitted to reported cumulative cases of the UE and of countries that accomplish two criteria: 4 
or more consecutive days with more than 100 cumulated cases, and at least one datapoint over 200 cases. 
Day t0 is chosen as that one at which N(t) overpasses 100 cases. If more than 15 datapoints that accomplish 
the stated criteria are available, only the last 15 points are used. The fitting is done using Matlab’s Curve 
Fitting package with Nonlinear Least Squares method, which also provides confidence intervals of fitted 
parameters (a and K) and the R2 of the fitting. At the initial stages the dynamics is exponential and K cannot 
be correctly evaluated. In fact, at this stage the most relevant parameter is a.  
It is worth to mention that the simplicity of this model and the lack of previous assumptions about the Covid-
19 behaviour make it appropriate for universal use, i.e., it can be fitted to any country independently of its 
socioeconomic context and control strategy. Then, the model is capable of quantifying the observed 
dynamics in an objective and standard manner and predicting short-term tendencies.  
(5) Using the model for predicting short-term tendencies 
The model is finally used for a short-term prediction of the evolution of the cumulated number of cases (3-5 
days). The confidence interval of predictions is assessed with the Matlab function predint, with a 99% 
confidence level. These predictions are shown in the plots as red dots with corresponding error bar. For series 
longer than 9 timepoints, last 3 points are weighted in the fitting so that changes in tendencies are well 
captured by the model. 
(6) Estimating non-diagnosed cases 
Lethality of Covid-19 has been estimated at around 1 % for Republic of Korea and the Diamond Princess 
cruise. Besides, median duration of viral shedding after Covid-19 onset has been estimated at 18.5 days for 
non-survivors15 in a retrospective study in Wuhan. These data allow for an estimation of total number of 
cases, considering that the number of deaths at certain moment should be about 1 % of total cases 18.5 days 
before. This is valid for estimating cases of countries at stage II, since in stage I the deaths would be mostly 
                                                          
14 Madden LV. Quantification of disease progression. Protection Ecology 1980; 2: 159-176. 
15 Zhou et al., 2020. Clinical course and risk factors for mortality of adult 
inpatients with COVID-19 in Wuhan, China: a retrospective 




due to the incidence at the country from which they were imported. We establish a threshold of 50 reported 
cases before starting this estimation.  
Reported deaths are passed through a moving average filter of 5 points in order to smooth tendencies. Then, 
the corresponding number of cases is found assuming the 1 % lethality. Finally, these cases are distributed 
between 18 and 19 days before each one.  
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